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R 111428Z JUN 93  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4045  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KIGALI 02265

DEPT FOR AF/C AND INR/IL/RD  
LILONGWE FOR DAO  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, RW  
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: KIGALI 2023

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS MESSAGE FULFILLS AN ESSENTIAL REPORTING

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY:  
ROBERT R. STRAND

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REQUIREMENT, PER REFTTEL.

SUMMARY  
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3. RWANDA'S ARMED FORCES ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. THE TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY, CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES, NEW POLITICAL TENDENCIES, NORTH-SOUTH REGIONALISM, RESENTMENT AMONG YOUNG OFFICERS, ETHNICISM, AND THE SPECTERS OF INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION ARE ALL CAUSING FRICTION WITHIN THE INSTITUTION. THIS ONCE WELL-TRAINED AND PROUD INSTITUTION HAS LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE POPULATION IT IS SUPPOSED TO DEFEND, STANDING ACCUSED OF LOOTING, INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

4. THE INSTITUTION IS NOT MONOLITHIC, AND ITS POSSIBLE REACTION TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGES UNDERWAY IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. THEIR OPTIONS SEEM TO BE TO ACCEPT THEIR NEW ROLE IN DEMOCRACY, SELF DESTRUCT IN  
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LEADERLESS MUTINY, OR TAKE POWER IN A COUP D'ETAT. THERE APPEARS TO BE NEITHER EVIDENCE OF NOR AN APPARENT LEADER FOR A COUP. WHILE THE MILITARY'S RESPONSE TO A DOD TEAM OF MILITARY LAWYERS, IN KIGALI TO PLAN A SEMINAR ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY A DEMOCRACY, WAS VERY POSITIVE, POST DOES NOT KNOW IF THERE IS A CRITICAL MASS IN THE MILITARY SUPPORTIVE OF THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. SHOULD PEACE COME, INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION WILL BE THE CRITICAL FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER DEMOCRACY WILL SURVIVE IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY.

TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY  
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5. DURING THE PERIOD 1973 TO 1990 THE ARMED FORCES WERE AN ORGAN OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY WAS TO PROTECT THAT STATE, THE MRND PARTY AND ITS PRESIDENT, MGEN. JUVENAL HABYARIMAA. THE PRESIDENT ALSO HELD THE FUNCTIONS OF DEFENSE MINISTER, AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE. DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS WERE UNDER THE

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CONTROL OF THE DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF (ARMY: COL. SERUBUGA; GENDARMERIE: COL. RWAGWAFILITA). ARMY OFFICERS HELD MINISTERIAL POSITIONS, WERE ELECTED AS DEPUTIES, AND WERE APPOINTED TO OTHER CIVIL JOBS.

6. POLITICAL PARTIES WERE LEGALIZED UNDER THE JUNE, 1991 CONSTITUTION. A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE WAS APPOINTED BY THE MULTIPARTY TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IN APRIL 1992. THE CONSTITUTION MADE POLITICAL PARTY  
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MEMBERSHIP ILLEGAL FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, A MOVE SUPPOSED TO MAKE THE INSTITUTION APOLITICAL.

7. THE CREATION OF NEW PARTIES, FOR THE MOST PART IN OPPOSITION TO THE MRND AND HABYARIMANA, WAS A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM. THE CHANGE OF THE ARMY'S ROLE FROM THAT OF SUPPORT AND PROTECTION OF HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND TO APOLITICAL PROTECTOR OF A MULTIPARTY STATE IS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY EITHER THE MILITARY OR THE CIVILIAN OPPOSITION. MRND HARDLINE OFFICERS SEE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AS A THREAT TO THE MRND, AS

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
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AMEMBASSY LILONGWE  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, RW  
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

COLLABORATORS WITH THE RPF, AND THUS, AS A THREAT TO  
THE ARMED FORCES. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES SEE THE  
MILITARY AS A TOOL OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY

8. HOWEVER, THE NEW POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN THE  
SOCIETY ARE INCREASINGLY REFLECTED WITHIN THE ARMED  
FORCES. SOLDIERS TALK OF THIS OR THAT OFFICER BEING  
ALLIED WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES, IN SPITE OF THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST PARTY MEMBERSHIP.  
IN SOME CASES, THIS HAS LED TO ONCE UPWARDLY MOBILE  
OFFICERS BEING REASSIGNED TO LESS RESPONSIBLE  
POSITIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
JAMES GASAMA HAS REPLACED HARDLINERS WITH MORE  
MODERATE OFFICERS IN SOME KEY POSITIONS. THE

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MILITARY REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO THE VISIT OF A  
DOD TEAM OF MILITARY LAWYERS WHICH VISITED KIGALI IN  
MAY, 1992 TO PLAN AN IMET-FUNDED SEMINAR ON THE ROLE  
OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY.

NORTH VS. SOUTH  
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9. SINCE HABYARIMANA'S TAKING OF POWER IN 1973,  
RECRUITMENT TO THE ARMED FORCES HAS CONCENTRATED  
HEAVILY ON MEN FROM THE PRESIDENT'S HOME PREFECTURE  
OF GISENYI, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT ON THE NEIGHBORING  
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RUHENGERI PREFECTURE. WHILE SOME MEN FROM OTHER  
AREAS DID MANAGE TO ENTER THE OFFICER'S CORPS AND DO  
RELATIVELY WELL PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, OFFICER  
RECRUITMENT SINCE OCTOBER, 1990 HAS BEEN ALMOST  
UNIQUELY FROM GISENYI. SOURCES WITHIN BELGIAN  
MILITARY COOPERATION, DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN OFFICER  
TRAINING AT THE OFFICER'S ACADEMY, TOLD ECONOFF THAT  
OF THE 120 MEN GRADUATED IN THE LAST THREE CLASSES,  
ONLY 10 WERE FROM A PREFECTURE OTHER THAN GISENYI.

10. THIS HEAVY RELIANCE ON OFFICERS FROM GISENYI IS  
NOT COMPLETELY REFLECTED IN THE RANK AND FILE. WHILE  
CANDIDATES FOR NCO POSITIONS ARE LARGELY FROM THE  
PROMISED LAND, PLACE OF ORIGIN FOR SOLDIERS ARE MORE  
EVENLY DISTRIBUTED. THIS HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS AS  
WELL. DURING THE FEB. 8, 1993 RPF OFFENSIVE, FRENCH  
SOURCES STATED THAT ENTIRE UNITS FLED IN THE FACE OF  
THE ENEMY, AND THAT UNITS MADE UP OF SOUTHERNERS WERE  
MORE LIKELY TO DESERT. THE ONLY AREA WHERE THE ARMY  
MANAGED TO RETREAT, REGROUP, AND COUNTERATTACK WAS IN  
RUHENGERI; THE TROOPS THERE ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM  
RUHENGERI AND GISENYI PREFECTURE.

11. THIS HAS CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT SOUTHERNERS  
WON'T FIGHT FOR THEIR COUNTRY AND THAT SOLDIERS FROM  
THE SOUTH ARE ALLIED WITH THE MDR OPPOSITION PARTY,  
AND MAY BE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE RPF. WHEN DESERTERS  
ARE SUBJECTED TO NONJUDICIAL MILITARY DISCIPLINE,  
RWAMDA'S HUMAM RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS POINT TO THE  
ORIGINS OF THE ACCUSED AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR  
PROSECUTION.

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12. THE NORTH - SOUTH DICHOTOMY HAS ALSO HAD ITS  
EFFECT ON PROMOTIONS. SOLDIERS SPENT THE NIGHT  
FIRING THEIR WEAPONS INTO THE AIR IN MAY 1991 IN  
PROTEST OF THAT YEAR'S PROMOTIONS LIST, WHICH MAY  
SAID FAVORED ONLY OFFICERS FROM THE NORTH. (THE  
PROMOTION LIST WAS LATER REVISED.)

OLD VS. YOUNG  
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13. LACK OF UPWARD MOBILITY WITHIN THE OFFICER'S

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AMEMBASSY LILONGWE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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MEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, RW  
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

CORPS HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF RESENTMENT AMONG YOUNG OFFICERS, MANY OF WHOM ENTERED THE CORPS IN THE 1980'S AND HAVE BENEFITTED FROM EXCELLENT TRAINING AT THE OFFICER'S ACADEMY AND IN BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE U.S. MOST HAVE THE EQUIVALENT OF A BACHELORS DEGREE, AND SEE THEMSELVES AS BETTER TRAINED AND MORE COMPETENT THAN THEIR COMMANDING OFFICERS.

14. HOWEVER, THE RAKS OF LT. COL. AND COL. ARE OVER SUBSCRIBED, CREATING A INVISIBLE WALL BLOCKING PROMOTION. THE YOUNGER OFFICERS FEEL THAT THEIR CAREERS ARE STYMIED BY MEN WHO ARE LITTLE MORE THAN MRND PARTY HACKS, WITH NO REAL MILITARY SKILLS. MANY OF THESE YOUNG TURKS CONSIDER THEMSELVES LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY, AND ARE AS LIKELY TO ACCUSE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES OF DISLOYALTY TO THE COUNTRY, AND EVEN OF HAVING TREASONOUS CONTACTS WITH THE RPF. HOWEVER, IT IS AMONG THESE OFFICERS THAT ONE FINDS A FLEXIBILITY OF THINKING AND PHILOSOPHY WHICH COULD LOAD THEM TO SUPPORT THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, AS LONG AS IT IS DONE WITHOUT DESTROYING THE INSTITUTION

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OF THE ARMED FORCES.

ETHNICITY AND INTEGRATION  
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15. THE RWAMDAM ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN DOMINATED BY THE HUTU ETHNIC GROUP SINCE INDEPENDENCE. WHILE SOME TUTSIS DID ENTER THE ARMY, AND A FEW MADE IT INTO THE OFFICER'S CORPS, THE OUTBREAK OF WAR SAW MANY OF THEM ARRESTED AS COLLABORATORS OR FORCED INTO RESERVE STATUS. RPF PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES SEE THE WAR AS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THEIR HUTU ARMY AND THE TUTSI INVADERS. MANY CONSIDER THE RPF'S ULTIMATE AIM TO BE TOTAL POWER, WHETHER BY FORCE OF ARMS IN OPEN WARFARE, OR BY FIFTH COLUMN ACTION AND SABOTAGE -- EVEN SABOTAGE AFTER THE SIGNING OF A PEACE ACCORD AND THE ENTERING OF THE RPF INTO A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI.

16. PEACE WILL BRING WITH IT INTEGRATION OF FORCES. THERE WILL BE RPF OFFICERS IN THE HIGH COMMAND, AND RPF POLITICIANS AMONG THE ARMY'S CIVILIAN MASTERS (ALTHOUGH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE WILL COME FROM THE MRMD PARTY). MANY OFFICERS SEE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RPF FORCES IN THE ARMY WILL IN FACT ACT AS INFILTRATORS, ASSISTING THE RPF POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE PLANNING OF A COUP FROM WITHIN, AND THUS ACCOMPLISHING THE RPF'S ULTIMATE GOAL -- TOTAL POWER.

DEMOBILIZATION  
-----

17. MASSIVE RECRUITMENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR HAS SWELLED THE RANKS OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE FROM SOME 10,000 MEN IN 1990 TO ROUGHLY 36,000 AT

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PRESENT. MANY OF THESE RECENT RECRUITS WILL



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LOGICALLY BE THE FIRST TO GO IF PEACE RETURNS TO THE  
COUNTRY AND SOME 30,000 GOR AND RPF TROOPS ARE  
DEMOBILIZED. MANY SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT  
THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO SIMPLY PUT THEM OUT TO  
PASTURE WITH NO THOUGHT TO THEIR REINTEGRATION INTO  
CIVILIAN SOCIETY. THE FIRST TIME DEMOBILIZATION WAS  
DISCUSSED ON THE NATIONAL RADIO (MAY, 1992), SOLDIERS  
MUTINIED IN THE TOWNS OF GISENYI AND RUHENGIERI,  
PILLAGING AND DESTROYING SHOPS AND HOMES. FOR MAY  
OF THESE MEN, PEACE AND DEMOCRACY HOLD NO POSITIVE  
DIVIDENDS.

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SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

A POPULATION DECEIVED  
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18. PRIOR TO THE WAR, THE ARMY WAS WELL REGARDED BY THE POPULATION (AT LEAST, THE HUTU MAJORITY). THE INITIAL SUCCESS IN REPELLING THE RPF INVASION WAS APPLAUDED, ALTHOUGH THE WHOLESALE ARREST OF TUTSIS AND PERSECUTION OF SOME SOLDIERS FOR ALLEGED COMPLICITY WITH THE REBELS WAS A FORETASTE OF THINGS TO COME. WITH THE CREATION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES THE MILITARY QUICKLY CAME UNDER FIRE, ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN DEATH THREATS AGAINST NON-MRND POLITICIANS, ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS, AND INVOLVEMENT IN A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED DEATH SQUAD.

19. AS THE RPF BEGAN TO HAVE SUCCESS IN PROSECUTING A GUERILLA WAR, THE ARMED FORCES CAME UNDER INCREASING ATTACK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST TUTSIS AND POLITICIANS. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ACCUSED THE ARMED FORCES OF, AT THE LEAST, NON-FEASANCE, AND AT MOST, COMPLICITY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION, IN THE 1992 MASSACRES OF TUTSIS IN BUGESERA AND GISENYI. THE DRAMATIC UPTURN IN ARMED ROBBERIES AND KILLINGS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR HAS LED THE POPULATION TO FEAR THE ARMED

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FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE GENDARMERIE, WHOSE MEMBERS ARE  
FOR THE MOST PART MORE POORLY TRAINED AND LESS  
EDUCATED THAN THOSE CHOSEN FOR THE ARMY.

OPINIONS IN THE OFFICER'S CORPS  
-----

20. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MILITARY IS NOT THE  
MONOLITHIC PARTY INSTITUTION IT ONCE WAS. SOME  
SENIOR COLONELS SEE THEIR DESTINY AS TIED TO THE  
PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY. MANY HAVE NOISY SKELETONS  
RATTLING IN THEIR CLOSETS, AND FEAR PROSECUTION FOR  
PAST CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE.

21. THE YOUNG TURKS ARE DIFFICULT TO CATEGORIZE, BUT  
APPEAR DIVIDED INTO AT LEAST THREE CAMPS. FIRST IS  
THE MRND LOYALISTS, WHO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITION  
PARTIES TO BE DUPLICITOUS, SEEKING ONLY THE OUSTER OF  
THE PRESIDENT, EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES COMMITTING  
TREASON WITH THE RPF. THE SECOND APPEARS READY TO  
THROW ITS LOT IN WITH ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE  
OPPOSITION PARTIES, SEEING NO FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES  
IN SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT. MOST OF THESE WOULD  
APPEAR TO SUPPORT THE SOUTHERN-BASED MDR PARTY,  
SEEING IN IT AT LEAST A HUTU-DOMINATED ORGANIZATION  
WITH A FACTION COMMITTED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE  
MAJORITY.

22. THE LAST CAMP SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT CHANGE IS  
INEVITABLE, AND THEORETICALLY SUPPORT THE MOVE TOWARD  
MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY. THEY HAVE NO TRUST FOR ANY OF  
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THE POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, AND THUS SEE THEIR  
SALVATION IN BEING APOLITICAL, IN THE HOPE THAT  
INSTITUTIONALIZING ELECTIONS WILL SOONER OR LATER  
BRING FORTH COMPETENT POLITICIANS TO RULE THE  
COUNTRY. HOWEVER, THEY SHARE THE FEAR OF THE FIRST  
TWO GROUPS THAT THE PEACE MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN  
THE WAR. THEY FEAR THAT INTEGRATION AND  
DEMOBILIZATION OF FORCES WILL CREATE A DIVIDED ARMY  
WHICH COULD TURN ON ITSELF AT THE SLIGHTEST

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SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

WHAT ARE THE ARMED FORCES' OPTIONS?  
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23. FACED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF THE OUTBREAK OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA, WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE REACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES? THE FIRST IS THAT WHICH ALL WOULD HOPE FOR: THAT THE MILITARY ADJUSTS TO AND ACCEPTS A NEW ROLE IN SOCIETY, THAT OF SUPPORTING THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, AND THE POLITICAL TENDENCY WHICH COMES OUT ON TOP AFTER ELECTIONS. THE SECOND IS ESSENTIALLY TO MUTINY, WITHOUT THE OBJECTIVE OF TAKING POLITICAL POWER. THIS IMPLIES A KIND OF SELF DESTRUCTION, WHERE THE INDISCIPLINED MASS OF SOLDIERS RUNS AMOK, WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP FROM THE OFFICER'S CORPS. SUCH A MUTINY COULD BE TRIGGERED BY NORTH-SOUTH RIVALRY, FEARS OF DEMOBILIZATION WITHOUT

COMPENSATION, OR BY THE ERUPTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INTEGRATED GOR AND RPF UNITS.

24. THE THIRD OPTION IS FOR THE ARMY TO ATTEMPT TO TAKE POWER. POST CONSIDERS AN ANTI-HABYARIMANA/MRND COUP IMPROBABLE. THE SENIOR OFFICER'S CORPS, PLUS THE TWO GROUPS OF YOUNG TURKS EITHER SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OR APOLITICAL, WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH IT. THERE COULD BE MORE BACKING FOR A COUP TO KEEP

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THE PRESIDENT IN POWER AND END BOTH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTYISM.

25. THE RESULTS OF SUCH A COUP WOULD PROBABLY BE CATASTROPHIC. POST ASSUMES THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A MASSIVE RPF ATTACK, WHICH WOULD MAKE

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MAJOR GAINS, PERHAPS EVEN SIEZING POWER IN KIGALI.  
THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY MASS MURDER OF TUTSIS IN  
MUCH OF THE COUNTRY, CIVIL WAR, AND CHAOS.

26. AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE THAT A  
COUP D'ETAT OF ANY KIND IS IN THE CARDS. IN  
PARTICULAR, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANYONE  
CAPABLE OF LEADING ONE. SENIOR OPPOSITION PARTY  
LEADERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE HARDLINERS COULD  
GARNER SUFFICIENT SUPPORT IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR A  
SUCCESSFUL COUP. GIVEN THE DIVISIONS DESCRIBED  
ABOVE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE WHOLE OF THE ARMED  
FORCES COULD BE COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT A COUP D'ETAT,  
NO MATTER WHO ITS LEADER OR WHAT ITS OBJECTIVES WOULD  
BE.

COMMENT  
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27. ARE THERE POSITIVE FORCES FOR CHANGE WITHIN THE  
ARMED FORCES? POST MUST NOTE THAT OUR ACCESS TO THE  
THE OFFICER'S CORPS, WHILE GOOD, IS STILL LIMITED.  
THAT GROUP OF OFFICERS CONSIDERED TO BE HARDLINERS  
HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY INACCESSIBLE. IN POST'S  
EXPERIENCE, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GOOD OFFICERS WHO  
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APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHANGES BEFORE THEM CAN BE  
POSITIVE FOR THE MILITARY (OR AT LEAST ARE NOT  
NEGATIVE ENOUGH TO BE ACTIVELY OPPOSED). AS AN  
EXAMPLE, THE CURRENT CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE  
GENDARMERIE, COL. NDINDILYIMANA, IS WIDELY  
CONSIDERED TO BE AN HONEST SOLDIER/POLITICIAN. SINCE  
TAKING THE UNENVIABLE JOB IN JUNE, 1992, HE HAS MADE  
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN REVAMPING THE IMAGE OF HIS  
FORCE. WHILE THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL THOUSAND RANK  
AND FILE GENDARMES WITH NO SPECIALIZED TRAINING AFTER  
BOOT CAMP, A GOOD PROPORTION OF THE 7,000-STRONG  
FORCE HAS BEEN GIVEN SPECIFIC POLICE TRAINING, WITH

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INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EUR-01
	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-19	L-03	ADS-00
	MMP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	FMP-00	RPE-01	CORE-00	/048W	
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R 111428Z JUN 93  
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4050  
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
 AMEMBASSY LILONGWE  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS  
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
 AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 KIGALI 02265

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TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, RW  
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

THE GOAL OF CHANGING THEIR MENTALITY FROM ONE OF "DESTROY THE ENEMY" TO THAT OF "PROTECT THE POPULATION." THE CHIEF OF STAFF IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN REMOVING HIS MEN FROM COMBAT DUTIES AT THE FRONT AND RE-INSTITUTING DISCIPLINE, AND IS PERHAPS THE MOST PROMINENT SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER TO BE GENERALLY TRUSTED BY OPPOSITION PARTIES.

28. AMONG THE YOUNG TURKS WHO SEEM COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY, WE FIND HIGHLY TRAINED OFFICERS FROM THE FRENCH SENIOR OFFICER'S ACCADEMY AND THE U.S COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE. OF INTEREST IS THEIR OPINION THAT SOLDIERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO VOTE IN THE FIRST MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS, TO FORCE THEM INTO AN APOLITICAL POSITION AND KEEP THE ARMY FROM BEING USED TO SKEW THE RESULTS.

29. IS THERE A CRITICAL MASS IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR POSITIVE CHANGE? THIS IS UNCERTAIN. EVEN IF THE ANSWER IS YES, THE PEACE, SHOULD IT COME, WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION PERIOD WILL BE CRITICAL TO MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE ENLARGED MULTIPARTY TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL. BADLY HANDLED, THIS COULD BE THE SINGLE MOST DANGEROUS FACTOR IN OBTAINING MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA.

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END COMMENT.  
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